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Notes
Aliens' Alienation from Justice: The Equal Access
to Justice Act Should Apply to Deportation
Proceedings
In the fiscal year 1987, 48,404 aliens faced the ordeal of de-
portation proceedings.' Often these aliens could not defend
their interests adequately because they could not speak Eng-
lish.2 An attorney versed in the extremely complicated law of
immigration 3 was indispensable to protect the aliens' interests
in staying in the country with family and friends. Because they
could not afford an attorney to represent them, however, the
aliens often faced the deportation proceedings alone.4 Further,
they were not entitled to court appointed counsel under the Im-
1. Elliot, Relief From Deportation: Part I, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 4 (Aug.
1988). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) deported 109,016
aliens in the fiscal years 1981-1986. Id. at 4. Deportation is especially hard on
the alien. The alien could be separated from family, sent to a strange country,
or could have no country to go to and thus be detained indefinitely. See Note,
An Opportunity to be Heard. The Right to Counsel in a Deportation Hearing,
63 WASH. L. REv. 1019, 1022 (1988); see also Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S.
6, 10 (1948) ("deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of
banishment or exile"); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (deporta-
tion can deprive a person "of all that makes life worth living").
2. Stern, Applying the Equal Access to Justice Act to Asylum Hearings,
97 YALE L.J. 1459, 1470 n.73 (1988).
3. See, e.g., Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (comparing the INA
to 'King Minos's labyrinth in ancient Crete" and stating the Act is "certain to
accelerate the aging process of judges"); see also Wasserman, Practical Aspects
of Representing an Alien at a Deportation Hearing, 14 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 111,
112 (1976) (calling the INA "the longest, the most ambiguous, the most compli-
cated, and the most illogical statute on the books").
4. Stern, supra note 2, at 1470. Legal aid is not likely to be forthcoming
either. Although some legal aid programs do exist, they are blatantly under-
staffed. 1d. at 1470; see also Note, INS Transfer Policy: Interference with De-
tained Aliens' Due Process Right to Retain Counsel, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2001,
2005-06 (1987) (stating the representation of aliens is done mostly by pro bono,
and most pro bono attorneys cannot afford to travel to hearings). In addition,
some alien detention centers are far removed from large cities. For example,
when a new detention facility was located in Oakdale, Louisiana, in 1986 there
were only five attorneys in the city. None had ever had an immigration case.
Stern, supra note 2, at 1470 n.77.
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migration and Nationality Act (INA).5
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) could help aliens
in this predicament. The EAJA potentially lessens the impact
of the aliens' gross disadvantages by providing for attorney fees
in certain agency adjudications.6 The federal courts of appeals,
however, are split on whether the EAJA applies to deportation
proceedings. The Ninth Circuit has held that the EAJA does
apply to deportation proceedings7 while the Third Circuit has
held that the EAJA does not apply."
The circuit courts agree that application of the EAJA to
deportation proceedings depends on whether the deportation
hearing is an "adversary adjudication" within the meaning of
the Act.9 An adversary adjudication, as defined in section 504,
5. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988);
Note, supra note 1, at 1027. The alien has no constitutional right to appointed
counsel. Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1975) (absence
of counsel did not deprive alien's hearing of the fundamental fairness required
by due process), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); Martin-Mendoza v. INS, 499
F.2d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988). Section 504(a) provides that:
An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a
prevailing party other than the United States, fees and other expenses
incurred by that party in connection with that proceeding, unless the
adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the position of the agency
was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust.
Id § 504(a)(1).
Individuals without tremendous resources are allowed to collect attorney
fees. An individual whose net worth is over $2,000,000 at the time the adjudi-
cation was initiated may not collect attorney fees. Id § 504(b)(1)(B)(i). There
is a similar provision for businesses and municipal governments. Any owner
of an unincorporated business, a partnership, or unit of local government
(with a few exceptions) may not collect attorney fees if the net worth of the
organization exceeds $7,000,000 or has more than 500 employees. Id
§ 504(b)(1)(B)(ii).
7. Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
8. Clarke v. INS, 904 F.2d 172, 178 (3d Cir. 1990). The Eleventh Circuit
has also considered whether the EAJA applies to deportation proceedings.
Ardestani v. INS, 904 F.2d 1505, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding the EAJA does
not apply to deportation proceedings), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 1101 (1991).
Even though the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Ardestani, the opin-
ion will not be considered in detail because the Eleventh Circuit's analysis
does not add any substantial arguments that did not consider the Clarke court
and is weaker analytically. For a brief analysis of the Ardestani opinion, see
infra note 129.
9. Adversary adjudication is defined in § 504(b)(1)(C) as "an adjudication
under section 554 of this title in which the position of the United States is rep-
resented by counsel or otherwise, but excludes an adjudication for the purpose
of establishing or fixing a rate or for the purpose of granting or renewing a
license." 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i) (1988).
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is "an adjudication under section 554 [of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)]."'' 0 Hence, the dispositive issue is
whether deportation proceedings are adversary adjudications
"under section 554" of the APA.-
This Note argues that the EAJA does apply to deportation
proceedings. Part I examines alien rights, the INA, and the
EAJA's purposes and scope. Part II discusses cases that have
considered whether the EAJA applies to deportation proceed-
ings. Part HI draws on the purposes behind the EAJA as well
as its legislative history to conclude that the EAJA applies to
deportation proceedings. Finally, this Note recommends using
a functional test to determine if the EAJA is applicable to
other agency proceedings.
I. ALIEN RIGHTS, THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY ACT, AND THE EQUAL ACCESS
TO JUSTICE ACT
A. ALIEN RIGHTS AND THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
AcT
The rights accorded to aliens' 2 flow from one premise:
10. Id. The phrase "under section 554" is ambiguous. See infra Part In.
B. 1. One plausible interpretation is that "under" means that the agency pro-
ceeding must be governed by § 554 of the APA before the EAJA applies. The
other possible interpretation is that the agency proceeding must be the func-
tional equivalent of APA proceedings or "in accordance with" the type of pro-
ceeding required by the APA. See, e.g., Escobar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at 1023.
11. If "under section 554" is interpreted to mean that the proceeding must
be governed by the APA, the EAJA does not apply to deportation hearings.
Ardestani, 904 F.2d at 1511-12; Clarke, 904 F.2d at 178. The INA provides that
the regulations promulgated under the Act provide the exclusive procedure
for deportation hearings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988). The Supreme Court has
held that the APA's hearing procedures are superseded by the INA proce-
dures in deportation hearings. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955).
If "under section 554" is interpreted to mean that the adjudication must
only be the functional equivalent of an APA adjudication or an adjudication
defined by APA standards, however, the EAJA does apply to deportation pro-
ceedings. Escobar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at 1030. The hearing procedures in deporta-
tion cases are similar in all important respects to the adjudication procedures
mandated by the APA. Id. at 1025.
The INS has consistently contended that the EAJA does not apply to de-
portation proceedings. Rudnick, EAJA Fees in Immigration Cases, IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS 1, 19 (Oct. 1989). The Bureau of Immigration Appeals has agreed
with this viewpoint, although it held the EAJA does apply to cases arising in
the Ninth Circuit because of that circuit's ruling the EAJA does apply to de-
portation cases. In re Anselmo, Int. Dec. 3105 (B.I.A. 1989) (deportation pro-
ceedings), digested in 66 INTERPRETER RELEAsES 598-601 (May 26, 1989).
12. Constitutional law concerning the rights of aliens differentiates be-
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every sovereign nation possesses the inherent power to regulate
the admission of foreigners into its territory.13 Consequently,
Congress enjoys plenary power to set standards for the admis-
sion, exclusion, and deportation of aliens.14
Although Congress has plenary power over aliens, the
Supreme Court has held that aliens nonetheless have proce-
dural due process rights when contesting their admission, ex-
clusion, and deportation.15 Because due process imposes no
substantive limits on Congress, 16 aliens can contest only
tween the rights of legal and illegal aliens. Legal aliens are properly docu-
mented immigrant aliens and non-immigrant aliens. Lopez & Lopez, The
Rights of Aliens in Deportation and Exclusion, 20 IDAHO L. REV. 731, 731
(1984). Immigrant aliens (also known as permanent aliens) have the privilege
to work and live permanently in the United States. Id Non-immigrant aliens
(e.g., tourists, students, etc.) are allowed in the United States only temporarily.
Id. "Illegal" aliens are termed "deportable" in United States law. Id
13. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954); Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). Although courts do not accord aliens the full
array of constitutional rights given citizens, aliens do possess some important
rights under the Constitution. For example, aliens' rights to receive, own, and
transfer property are protected by the equal protection clause. Lopez & Lo-
pez, supra note 12, at 733. Aliens also have the same access to the judiciary as
citizens. Id, at 734. In addition, all aliens accused of crimes are protected
under the fifth and sixth amendments. Id at 734-35.
Although the Constitution does not explicitly give the right to regulate
the admission of foreigners, the Supreme Court has implied the power as a
right every sovereign nation enjoys. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581, 609 (1889); Note, supra note 1, at 1025.
14. Galvan, 347 U.S. at 531 ("[p]olicies pertaining to the entry of aliens
and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political con-
duct of government"); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952)
("The Government's power to terminate its hospitality has been asserted and
sustained by this Court since the question first arose."). Congress has estab-
lished twenty grounds for deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988). Many of these
are similar to the grounds for exclusion. Compare Immigration and National-
ity Act of 1952, § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988) (grounds for exclusion) with Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1988) (grounds for
deportation).
15. Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530-31. Because the regulation of aliens is pecu-
liarly concerned with the political conduct of government, courts only have
the power to make sure that the alien is treated fairly under whatever law
Congress has passed. Id at 530-31 (when enforcing government policies, the
executive branch must obey the procedural safeguards of due process, but
Congress has plenary power to decide the conditions aliens must satisfy to re-
main in the United States).
16. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)
(" 'Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process so far
as the alien denied entry is concerned.... [I]t is not within the province of any
court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the
political branch of the Government.'" (citations omitted)). Aliens have no
right to enter the United States. Helton, Reconciling the Power to Bar or Ex-
1188 [Vol. 75:1185
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whether the government followed its own procedures. 17
The APA governs most administrative hearings.' 8 In 1955,
however, the Supreme Court held in Marcello v. Bonds' 9 that
the INA,20 and not the APA, governs deportation proceedings.
2
'
INA procedures22 guarantee the alien the right to reasonable
notice, to counsel, to examine witnesses, and to present evi-
pel Aliens on Political Grounds with Fairness and the Freedoms of Speech and
Association: An Analysis of Recent Legislative Proposals, 11 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 467, 476 (1988). However, minimal due process is usually given to an alien
trying to enter the country. Lopez & Lopez, supra note 12, at 749. The ex-
cluded alien gets a fair hearing, statutes must be complied with, and rulings
must be based on evidence having adequate support on the record. Id.
17. Lopez & Lopez, supra note 12, at 746. Alien rights end with proce-
dural due process. Congress can withhold admission or deport an alien on any
substantive ground. Id. at 752.
18. Until 1955, it was unclear whether the APA applied to deportation
proceedings. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 303-05 (1955).
19. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
20. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1988). Congress passed the INA to create a
comprehensive and revised immigration and naturalization law. H.R. REP. No.
1365, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1653 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1365].
21. Marcello, 349 U.S. at 310. More specifically, the Court held that when
the procedures of the two statutes diverge, the INA provisions take prece-
dence over the APA. Id. The Court noted that Congress used the APA as a
model when constructing the INA hearing procedures, but because Congress
detailed the hearing procedures in the INA it was clear Congress was taking
the general provisions of the APA and creating a specialized procedure for the
specific needs of the deportation process. Id. at 308. It also noted that the stat-
ute provides that the INA procedure was deemed the exclusive procedure in
the statute. Id. at 309. Thus, the Court concluded that the INA supersedes the
hearing provisions of the APA. Id. at 310.
The major difference between the INA and the APA that the Court found
to be of special importance, the functions of the hearing officer, has now been
eliminated. At the time of the Marcello opinion, the INA allowed the same
person to be both the hearing officer and the prosecutor while the APA for-
bade hearing officers to have a prosecutorial role. Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838
F.2d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc). Amendments in the immigration reg-
ulations, however, have extinguished any meaningful differences between the
roles of the hearing officers subject to the INA or APA. Escobar Ruiz v. INS,
813 F.2d 283, 292 (9th Cir. 1987).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) provides that:
A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this sec-
tion to determine the deportability of any alien, and shall administer
oaths, present and receive evidence, interrogate, examine, and cross-
examine the alien or witnesses, and, as authorized by the Attorney
General, shall, make determinations, including orders of deportation.
Determination of deportability in any case shall be made only upon a
record make in a proceeding before a special inquiry officer, at which
the alien shall have reasonable opportunity to be present .... No spe-
cial inquiry officer shall conduct a proceeding in any case under this
section in which he shall have participated in investigative functions
1991] 1189
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
dence.23 Aliens do not, however, have a right to appointed
counsel.24 Section 292 of the INA states that aliens shall have
the right to counsel, but "at no expense to the Government."
Deportation hearings typically begin with a hearing before
an immigration judge.26 Aliens may appeal the judge's decision
to the Board of Immigration Appeals.2 When administrative
appeals are exhausted, the United States Courts of Appeals
have jurisdiction to review the immigration judge's decision.2
B. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
1. Attorney Fees Before the EAJA
Before Congress passed the EAJA, federal courts applied
the American Rule to reject prevailing parties' claims for attor-
or in which he shall have participated ... in prosecuting functions
.... [R]egulations shall include requirements that -
(1) the alien shall be given notice, reasonable under all the cir-
cumstances, of the nature of the charges against him and of the time
and place at which the proceedings will be held;
(2) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented (at no
expense to the Government) by such counsel... as he shall choose;
(3) the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the
evidence against him, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to
cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government; and
(4) no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based
upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence. The procedure
so prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determin-
ing the deportability of an alien under this section.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988).
The INS is responsible for apprehending and prosecuting deportable
aliens. Lopez & Lopez, supra note 12, at 750-51. This enforcement mentality
makes it very difficult to safeguard alien rights. Id
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988) ("In any exclusion or deportation proceedings
... the person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no
expense to the government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such pro-
ceedings, as he shall choose." (emphasis added)).
25. Id,
26. 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.14, 242.1(a) (1990). Immigration judges are independent
from the INS enforcement apparatus. The Attorney General separated the
Immigration Court and the INS by creating a new office, the Executive Office
for Immigration Review. See Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 813 F.2d 283, 292 (9th Cir.
1987); Stern, supra note 2, at 1467.
27. 8 C.F.R. § 3.36 (1990).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1lO5a (1988). Although deportation proceedings are civil,
the standard of proof is higher than in normal civil proceedings. Woodby v.
INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966). The government has to prove deportability by
"clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence. Id Because the ex post facto
clause does not apply to aliens, deportability can be based on conduct prior to
the passage of a deportation law. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955);
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
1190 [Vol.•75:1185
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ney fees.29 Under the American Rule, all parties are responsi-
ble for paying their own attorney fees and other expenses
incurred during litigation.3 0 Courts justified the American
Rule by concluding that the fear of having to pay the opposing
party's attorney fees would deter worthy plaintiffs from bring-
ing suit.3 ' Courts carved out a few exceptions to the American
Rule, however, allowing fee shifting3 2 in two common law situ-
ations.33 Congress also enacted several statutory exceptions,3 4
believing that awarding fees could further important policy
goals. 35
In addition to these exceptions, some federal appellate
courts created a "private attorney general" rule in the early
29. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975).
30. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4984, 4986 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1418].
31. Id at 9, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmNW. NEws at 4988.
32. Fee shifting allows the winner in the litigation to collect her attorney
fees from the loser.
33. There are two main common law exceptions to the American Rule.
The first permits awards to a prevailing party who secured a common fund for
many claimants. This is known as the common benefit exception. Alyeska
Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 257. The second permits fee awards when the losing
party acted with manifest bad faith during the litigation. I& at 258-59; Stern,
supra note 2, at 1461.
34. For examples of statutory exceptions, see Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1988) (allowing attorney fees to prevailing party if party
wins under Public Accommodations portion of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6); Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1988);
Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1988) (allowing attorney fee
recovery if person's wire communication is intercepted or used in violation of
ch. 119 Organized Crime Control Act, ch. 119, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1988));
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1988) (allowing
fee against United States when "complainant has substantially prevailed" in
FOIA action); Voting Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1988) (allowing
reasonable attorney fee as part of costs to "enforce voting guarantees of the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendment"); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) (allowing attorney fee when complainant enforces
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985-1986).
35. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra, note 30, at 8, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 4987. For example, see the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). The purpose of the Act was twofold.
First, Congress realized civil rights laws depend heavily on private enforce-
ment. Congress wanted citizens to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate
the congressional policies embodied by the civil rights laws. S. REP. No. 1011,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5908, 5909. Second, Congress wanted citizens to recover what it cost them to
vindicate their civil rights in court. Id. at 2, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5910; see also AlyeskPa Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 263 ("Congress has opted
to rely heavily on private enforcement to implement public policy and to allow
counsel fees so as to encourage private litigation").
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1970s. 36 Under this rule, plaintiffs who prevailed in cases that
advanced significant public purposes3 7 could receive attorney
fees from private parties because they were acting as a "private
attorney general. '38 Courts reasoned that these plaintiffs were
acting not only for themselves, but for the public as a whole.39
Consequently, courts advanced a policy of furthering the public
interest by encouraging relatively poor plaintiffs to protect
their rights and bring suits that cost might otherwise
preclude.40
In 1975, however, the Supreme Court overruled the private
attorney general exception in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society.41 The Court held that courts can award at-
torney fees against the government only when statutes specifi-
cally authorize such fees.42 The Court reasoned that, although
the private attorney general rule might be good public policy,
only Congress could decide when such fee shifting was
desirable.43
Congress responded to the Court's elimination of the pri-
vate attorney general rule by passing statutes that expressly au-
thorized attorney fees.4 In 1980, Congress passed the EAJA,
36. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 270.
37. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1032-33 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (litigation vindicated important statutory rights of citizens and ensured
the governmental system functioned properly), rev'd sub nom Alyeska Pipe-
line, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
38. Rudnick, supra note 11, at 2.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y, 495 F.2d at 1036. The court argued-
Acting as private attorneys general, not only ha[s] [Wilderness Soci-
ety] ensured the proper functioning of our system of government, but
they have advanced and protected in a very concrete manner substan-
tial public interests. An award of fees would not have unjustly dis-
couraged... Alyeska from defending its case in court. And denying
fees might well have deterred [Wilderness Society] from undertaking
the heavy burden of this litigation.
Id; see also Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219, 220 (1st Cir. 1974) (private attorney
general rationale used to award fees in prison inmates civil rights action be-
cause "public... benefits when the constitutionality of the treatment of pris-
oners is assured").
41. 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975). The Court eliminated the "private attorney
general" rule with respect to private litigants and held that the exception
could not be used in suits against the federal government. Id at 267-68.
42. Id-
43. Id. at 271.
44. For example, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)); see also Rudnick, supra note 11, at 3 (stating Congress
reacted to the Alyeska Pipeline decision with a "flurry of legislative activity").
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an expansive exception to the American Rule.4 5
2. Attorney Fees Under the EAJA
a. The EAJA's Statutory Provisions
The EAJA awards attorney fees to a prevailing party6 in
court proceedings,4 7 including judicial review of administrative
actions, and in agency adjudications,4 unless the government's
position4 9 was substantially justified5 or the surrounding cir-
45. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988). Congress first passed the
EAJA as an addition to the Small Business Export Expansion Act, Pub. L. No.
96-481 §§ 203-204, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325-29 (1980). The bill contained a sunset pro-
vision providing for an automatic repeal on October 1, 1984, unless Congress
voted for an extension. Id. §§ 203(c), 204(c), 94 Stat. at 2329. Congress made
the EAJA permanent in 1985 by passing the reenactment statute. Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act, Extension and Amendment, Pub. L. No. 99-80 § 6(a)-(b), 99
Stat. 183, 186 (repealing §§ 203(c) and 204(c) of original EAJA and making the
EAJA permanent). The reenactment amendments applied retroactively to
any case started by October 1, 1984, and finished before the law was reenacted.
Id. § 7(b), 99 Stat. at 186.
46. Congress intended that the term "prevailing party" would "be consis-
tent with the law that has developed under existing statutes." H.R. REP. No.
1418, supra note 30, at 11, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmNn. NEws at 4990.
Thus, a party can be deemed prevailing if "he obtains a favorable settlement of
his case... or even if he does not ultimately prevail on all issues." Id. at 11,
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4990; see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (prevailing party is one who succeeds on any significant
issue in the litigation and achieves some of the benefits sought by the party).
47. 24 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) provides that:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall
award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and
other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsec-
tion (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases
sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency
action, brought by or against the United States in any court having ju-
risdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances
make an award unjust.
24 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 504 provides that:
An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a
prevailing party other than the United States, fees and other expenses
incurred by that party in connection with that proceeding, unless the
adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the position of the agency
was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust.
5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988).
49. The definition of the government's position was liberalized in the 1985
amendments. Before there was a question whether "position of the agency"
meant only its litigation posture, or included the actions of the agency that led
up to the litigation. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 9, re-
printed in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 132, 137 [hereinafter H.R.
REP. No. 120]. Several courts had held that only the government's litigation
1991] 1193
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cumstances would make an award unjust.51 The standard for
whether government action is substantially justified is essen-
tially one of reasonableness. 52 The government must show that
its case had a reasonable basis in both law and fact.53 In passing
the EAJA, Congress reasoned that private litigants were not
only defending their vested interests, but also refining and for-
mulating public policy. 4 Thus, fairness dictated that such liti-
gants receive attorney fees when the government position was
not substantially justified.55
b. Purposes of the EAJA
The EAJA has three main purposes. First, the Act aids
victims of unjustified government action 6 who otherwise could
posture needed to be reasonable, but Congress wanted both the government's
underlying action and its litigation posture to be substantially justified before
a fee award was precluded. The 1985 amendments make it clear that the posi-
tion of the government includes both its actions that led up to the litigation,
and its litigation position. Equal Access to Justice Act, Extension and Amend-
ment, Pub. L. No. 99-80 § 1(c)(3), 99 Stat. 183, 184 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(b)(1)(E) (1988)); id § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. 183, 185 (codified at 24 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(2)(D) (1988)).
50. The Supreme Court has held that "substantially justified" means only
that the government's position has to have a reasonable basis in both law and
fact. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). This result contradicts the
EAJA's legislative history. A House report states that when Congress passed
the Act in 1980, it rejected the standard of "reasonably justified" in favor of
"substantially justified;" thus, "the test must be more than mere reasonable-
ness." H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 49, at 9, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 138. The government has the burden of proving that its action was
substantially justified. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 30, at 10, 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 4989.
51. For an example of special circumstances making an award unjust, see
Oguachuba v. INS, 706 F.2d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 1983) (alien's "notorious and re-
peated violations" of federal law made EAJA award unjust). Few awards have
been overturned on this ground. Stern, supra note 2, at 1463.
52. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565.
53. Id
54. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 30, at 10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 4988-89.
55. Id. at 10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4989 ('Wlhere par-
ties are serving a public purpose, it is unfair to ask them to finance through
their tax dollars unreasonable government action and also bear the costs of
vindicating their rights.").
56. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 30, at 6, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmiN. NEWS at 4984 ("The purpose of the bill is to reduce the deterrents and
disparity by entitling certain prevailing parties to recover an award of attorney
fees, expert witness fees and other expenses against the United States, unless
the Government action was substantially justified."). Congress found that gov-
ernment bureaucracies were coercing compliance with the law by using their
greater resources to outlast their poorer adversaries. Id at 10, 1980 U.S. CODE
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not defend their rights because of the cost of litigation.57 Sec-
ond, Congress sought to deter unjustified government action58
by requiring the agency that took the action to pay the fee
award.59 Third, Congress hoped to expose government action
to more adversarial testing60 in order to promote fair laws and
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4988; see also United States v. 1,378.65 Acres of
Land, 794 F.2d 1313, 1315-16 (8th Cir. 1986) (Congress passed EAJA "to en-
courage relatively impecunious private parties to challenge abusive or unrea-
sonable government behavior by relieving such parties of the fear of incurring
large litigation expenses" (citing Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 549 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984))).
57. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 30, at 10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 4988. The extensive expansion of government relations during
the 1970s exacerbated this problem. Id. Congress was concerned that, just as
the influence of the bureaucracy was having more effect on individuals, the
ability of individuals to contest agency action was decreasing. Thus, the deter-
rent effect of being unable to collect fees from the government was a debilitat-
ing problem due to the pervasive presence of the bureaucracy. Id. Although
the original rationale for the American Rule was to not deter litigation for
fear of having to pay the other side's attorney fees, Congress found that the
American Rule was actually deterring litigation against the government be-
cause individuals could not fight a foe with such enormous wealth. Id. at 9,
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4988. People without great personal
wealth were forced to endure agency-caused injustice rather than contest it be-
cause the cost of litigation exceeded the benefit that litigation could offer. Id.
58. Id. at 20, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 4999; see also id. at
12, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 4991 ("fee-shifting becomes an
instrument for curbing excessive regulation and the unreasonable exercise of
Government authority"); H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 49, at 9-10, 1985 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 137-38 (stating that the courts should consider
the agency's underlying action when deciding if it acted with "substantial justi-
fication" or else the incentive for careful agency action would be removed).
59. 5 U.S.C. § 504(d) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(4) (1988). Congress hoped
that losing fee awards would make the agency rethink its actions because it
was losing money from its budget. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 30, at 16,
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4995 (stating that fee awards should
be paid by the budget of the agency whose actions were contested in order to
make each agency accountable for its actions); Equal Access to Justice Act of
1979, S. 265: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Ma-
chinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1979)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini) (arguing that EAJA "represents a vital weapon
in our struggle to tame Government regulations" and that the best way to
make agencies more responsible would be by taking attorney fees out of the
agency's budget); see also Robertson & Fowler, Recovering Attorneys' Fees
From the Government Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 56 TUL. L. REv.
903, 914 (1982) ("Congress imposed the risk of a fee award as an incentive for
agencies to police their own enforcement and other litigation activities more
rigorously, so that only sound, well-prepared cases would be initiated or
litigated.").
60. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 30, at 10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 4988-89. Congress feared that legal precedent was being set in
situations where individuals did not have a true opportunity to challenge
agency action. Id. at 10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4988. Con-
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policies.61
c. Scope of the EAJA
The EAJA does not apply to situations governed by other
fee shifting statutes.62 It does apply to proceedings governed by
the APA. It is unclear whether the EAJA applies to proceed-
ings that are functionally equivalent to those governed by the
APA.63
When Congress passed the EAJA it required the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States (ACUS) to develop
model rules to guide agencies in the EAJA's implementation.6
The ACUS suggested a broad reading of the EAJA,6 arguing
that given its purposes, the EAJA should apply when a party
has gone through a formal hearing regardless of whether the
APA governs the proceeding.6
Despite the ACUS's suggested rules, courts were unsure
whether the EAJA covered certain agency adjudications, such
as social security hearings.67 In response, Congress included a
provision in the legislative history of the 1985 EAJA reenact-
gress wanted to allow people to contest government action in court so the deci-
sion would be based on the merits of the case, not on the cost of litigating. Id
at 10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 4988-89. If the government
were able to coerce compliance because of its greater resources, precedent
would be established without seriously considering positions contrary to those
of the government. Id at 10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMM. NEws at 4988.
Congress believed this would undermine the integrity of the judicial process.
id-
61. Congress believed an adjudication could demonstrate that policy was
misguided, or that it could lead to the development of more precise rules. Id.
at 10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4989.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
63. See, e.g., infra Part II (different views of the Escobar Ruiz and Clarke
courts on the scope of the EAJA).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1988). This section states that each agency should
establish uniform procedures for the consideration of fee awards under the
EAJA after consulting with the ACUS. Id
65. The commentary to the model rules notes: "Exactly what proceedings
are encompassed by [the language of the EAJA] has long been a difficult legal
question, and we proposed a broad interpretation of the reference to adjudica-
tions 'under section 554' largely to avoid protracted debate about whether par-
ticular proceedings fall within its ambit." Equal Access to Justice Act:
Agency Implementation, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900, 32,901 (1981).
66. Id The ACUS stated: "[C]onsidering the purposes of the [EAJA],
questions of its coverage should turn on substance - the fact that a party has
endured the burden and expense of a formal hearing - rather than technicali-
ties." Id
67. H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 49, at 10, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & An-
MiN. NEWS at 138-39.
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ment that extended the EAJA to social security hearings.68 In
addition, Congress amended the EAJA to include contract ap-
peals made under the Contract Disputes Act69 within its
scope.70
Even with these clarifying amendments, the EAJA's scope
remains unclear. The circuit courts agree that application of
the EAJA depends on whether the particular hearing is an "ad-
versary adjudication" within the meaning of the Act.71 An ad-
versary adjudication, as defined in section 504, is an
"adjudication under section 554 [of the APA]."72
The Eighth Circuit has used language suggesting that "an
adjudication under section 554" means an adjudication defined
by the terms of section 554.73 Other circuits, however, have
adopted a narrower view of the EAJA's scope. For example,
the Sixth Circuit has held that the EAJA does not cover bene-
fit determinations under the Federal Employees Compensation
Act74 (FECA) because the APA does not govern FECA hear-
ings.75 The District of Columbia Circuit has also adopted a nar-
row view of the EAJA, holding that a company that
successfully challenged a Department of Energy (DOE) price
regulation was not entitled to EAJA fees because the APA did
not govern the hearing.76
68. I&
69. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988).
70. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C) (1988). With this section, Congress overruled
an earlier court's decision holding that contract appeals are not covered by the
EAJA. See Fidelity Constr. Co. v. United States, 700 F.2d 1379, 1387 (Fed. Cir.
1983). The Fidelity court had held that contract appeals were not covered by
the EAJA because the APA does not govern those proceedings. Id at 1386.
71. "Adversary adjudication" is defined in § 504(b)(1)(C)(i) as "an adjudi-
cation under section 554 of this title in which the position of the United States
is represented by counsel or otherwise, but excludes an adjudication for the
purpose of establishing or fixing a rate or for the purpose of granting or re-
newing a license." 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i) (1988).
72. Id
73. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting
the terms of § 554 of the APA to define what "adversary adjudication" meant
in the EAJA).
74. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1988).
75. Owens v. Brock, 860 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1988). Relying on the princi-
ple of statutory construction that waivers of sovereign immunity should be
construed strictly, the court held that because FECA claims are not governed
by the APA, they are not "adversary adjudications" and thus the EAJA does
not apply in FECA proceedings. Id. at 1366.
76. St. Louis Fuel & Supply Co. v. FERC, 890 F.2d 446, 451 (D.C. Cir.
1989). The proceedings are governed by the Department of Energy Organiza-
tion Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7375 (1988) (DOE Organization Act). The court rea-
soned that the DOE Organization Act does not require that hearings be "on
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The Supreme Court has not specifically decided whether
the phrase "under section 554" means "governed by" or "de-
fined by." In Sullivan v. Hudson,77 however, the Court recently
endorsed a broad reading of the EAJA.78 In extending the
EAJA to cases involving administrative adjudications on re-
mand from district court,79 the Court reasoned that such adju-
dications are so intimately tied to judicial proceedings that they
may be considered part of the "civil action" for purposes of a
fee award.80 In reaching its decision, the Court interpreted the
statute in light of its purpose of removing obstacles to litigation
against the government.81 The Court thus rejected the narrow
interpretation proffered by the government that a "civil action"
can occur only in a court of law.8 2
In the deportation context, the government has argued
consistently that the EAJA does not apply to deportation pro-
ceedings.83 Aliens, however, have begun to argue that the
the record" as required by the APA. St Louis Fuel, 890 F.2d at 448. In addi-
tion, the court concluded that Congress wrote a bright-line rule into the
EAJA. Id. at 451. EAJA fees are possible in those adjudications that are gov-
erned by the APA, but not in adjudications that are not subject to that statute.
Id.
77. 490 U.S. 877 (1989).
78. In Sullivan, the Court read the statute in light of its purpose. Id. at
890. The issue was whether a social security claimant is entitled to fees under
the EAJA for representation provided during administrative proceedings on
remand from the district court. Id at 879. The Court had to decide whether
the term "civil action" included proceedings outside a court of law. Id. at 882-
83. The Social Security administrator argued that "civil action" only meant
proceedings that occurred in a court of law. Id. at 891. The Court rejected
that narrow view, holding that administrative proceedings can be so intimately
tied with judicial proceedings that they can be considered part of the "civil ac-
tion" for purposes of a fee award. Id. at 890. A "civil action" can include ad-
ministrative proceedings necessary to the completion of a civil action. Id. at
892.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 889-90.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 891-92.
83. Rudnick, supra note 11, at 19. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals
has agreed with this viewpoint, although it held the EAJA does apply to cases
arising in the Ninth Circuit because of that circuit's ruling that the EAJA does
apply to deportation cases. In re Anselmo, Int. Dec. 3105 (B.I.A. 1989) (depor-
tation proceedings), digested in 66 INTrEPRTER RELEASES 598, 598-601 (1989).
The Attorney General's regulations specifying which administrative proceed-
ings conducted by the Department of Justice are covered by the EAJA do not
include deportation hearings as one of the proceedings covered by the Act.
Department of Justice Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act in
Department of Justice Administrative Proceedings, 28 C.F.R. § 24.103 (1990).
The ACUS did not criticize the Attorney General's regulation. See Implemen-
tation of the Equal Access to Justice Act in Department of Justice Administra-
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EAJA should apply to deportation proceedings.84 The Ninth
and Third Circuits have polarized the analysis of whether
"under section 554" means the EAJA only covers proceedings
"governed by" the APA or includes proceedings "defined by"
APA standards.s5
H. APPLYING THE EAJA TO DEPORTATION
PROCEEDINGS
A. EscoBAR Ruiz v. INS
The Ninth Circuit, the first federal court of appeals to con-
sider whether the EAJA applies to deportation proceedings,
held in Escobar Ruiz v. JIVS86 that the EAJA did apply to such
proceedings.8 7 The dispute before the court centered on the
meaning of the phrase "an adjudication under section 554" of
the APA. The government argued that "under" meant "con-
ducted under" or "governed by" section 5 54 .88 Because the INA
governs deportation proceedings, the government argued that
the EAJA did not apply to deportation proceedings.8 9 The ap-
pellant, Escobar Ruiz, countered that "under" meant "as de-
fined by" or "under the meaning of" section 554 of the APA.90
He argued that deportation proceedings were functionally
equivalent to APA hearings, and thus were of the type "defined
tive Proceedings, 47 Fed. Reg. 15,774-76 (1982) (codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 24.101-
24.309).
84. See infra Part 11.
85. See id
86. 838 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc). The case arose when Escobar
Ruiz allegedly entered the United States without inspection. Id at 1022. The
immigration judge ruled he was deportable, and the Bureau of Immigration
Appeals affirmed. Id After Escobar Ruiz appealed to the Ninth Circuit, the
INS reopened his deportation proceedings. Id Escobar Ruiz then applied for
attorney fees under the EAJA. Id In the first of three decisions, the court
held that § 292 of the INA does not preclude application of the EAJA. Esco-
bar Ruiz v. INS, 787 F.2d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1986). The court held that the
EAJA applies to all civil actions not covered by existing fee shifting statutes.
Id. at 1297.
In the second proceeding, the government argued that deportation was not
an "adversary adjudication" within the meaning of the EAJA. Escobar Ruiz v.
INS, 813 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1987). The court held that deportation pro-
ceedings did meet the EAJA's definition of adversary adjudication. Id. at 293.
After these two proceedings, the Ninth Circuit heard the case en banc. Esco-
bar Ruiz, 838 F.2d 1020.
87. Escobar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at 1030.
88. Id at 1023.
89. I&
90. Id.
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by" the APA.91
Because the Ninth Circuit found both interpretations of
the phrase plausible, it examined the legislative history and
purposes of the EAJA to determine the correct interpreta-
tionY2 When deciding which interpretation was correct the
court considered three factors: the legislative history surround-
ing the EAJA, the purposes of the EAJA, and the EAJA's ap-
plicability to social security proceedings.9 3
The court found that the conference committee that passed
the original EAJA used a "defined under" standard.94 In addi-
tion, the ACUS95 also used a "defined by" standard.96 Because
both the original conference committee and the ACUS sup-
ported a "defined by" interpretation, the court reasoned that
this interpretation best effectuated congressional intent.9
As a policy matter, the court argued that the broader "de-
fined by" standard was more consistent with the EAJA's goals
and objectives.9 8 Congress passed the EAJA to counter deter-
rents to litigation against the government.9 Moreover, because
deportation proceedings are as burdensome as adjudications
91. Id
92. Id. The court found its use of legislative history "particularly appro-
priate" because the case was one of first impression. Id.
93. Id at 1023-27.
94. Id. at 1023. The conference committee in its statement said the stat-
ute: "defines adversary adjudication as an agency adjudication defined under
the Administrative Procedures [sic] Act where the agency takes a position
through representation by counsel or otherwise." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1434,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM]N.
NEWS 5003, 5012 (emphasis added) [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1434].
The APA defines adjudication as an adjudication: "required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearig...." 5
U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
95. The EAJA requires agencies to promulgate their own rules after con-
sultation with the ACUS. 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1988).
96. Escobar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at 1024. The commentary to the model rules
notes: "Exactly what proceedings are encompassed by [the language of the
EAJA] has long been a difficult legal question, and we proposed a broad inter-
pretation of the reference to adjudications 'under section 554' largely to avoid
protracted debate about whether particular proceedings fall within its ambit."
Equal Access to Justice Act: Agency Implementation, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900,
32,901 (1981). The court also noted the fact that the ACUS believed that
"'considering the purposes of the [EAJA], questions of its coverage should
turn on substance - the fact that a party has endured the burden and expense
of a formal hearing - rather than technicalities."' Escobar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at
1024 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900, 32,901 (1981)).
97. Escobar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at 1024.
98. Id. at 1025. The court found the government's "hypertechnical, highly
restrictive" interpretation would not serve those purposes nearly as well. Id.
99. Id. at 1026. The statute's primary purpose is to "increase the accessi-
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governed by the APA, the court found no practical basis to ex-
clude deportation hearings from the EAJA.10° Indeed, the
court found that the nature of deportation proceedings sup-
ported applying the EAJA to ensure that the INS prosecuted
aliens only when the basis of the prosecution was at least
colorable.1°1
Finally, the Ninth Circuit compared social security adjudi-
cations and deportation proceedings.10 2 The court noted that
when Congress reenacted the EAJA, it included social security
administrative hearings among those proceedings that the
EAJA covers103 Thus, Congress's inclusion of social security
proceedings indicated that the EAJA already covered more
than just cases governed directly by the APA.1' 4 Congress was
concerned primarily with whether the hearings were "of the
type defined under section 554."105 The court concluded that
because deportation proceedings, like social security hearings,
were of the type defined by section 554 of the APA, but not
governed by it, the EAJA applied to deportation proceedings. 08
bility to justice - in administrative proceedings and civil actions." H.R. REP.
No. 120, supra note 49, at 8, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEws at 136.
100. Escobar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at 1026. The court wrote:
Adjudications determined on the record after an agency hearing
where the government is represented tend to be expensive and time-
consuming proceedings, and are especially likely to discourage legiti-
mate claimants from vindicating their rights. In particular, deporta-
tion proceedings are difficult for aliens to fully comprehend, let alone
conduct, and individuals subject to such proceedings frequently re-
quire the assistance of counsel. Certainly such individuals have "con-
crete interests" at stake, yet the expense involved may often deter
them from asserting their rights against unreasonable governmental
action.
ICE
The court also reasoned that not applying the EAJA would be inconsis-
tent with congressional intent. d.
101. Id. In addition to the fact that the "deterrent effect" of cost was no
less harmful in deportation hearings than APA adjudications, the court rea-
soned that public policy would suffer if aliens couldn't challenge arbitrary gov-
ernment action in deportation hearings. Id.
102. Id. at 1026-27.
103. Id. The court noted that there had been a question of whether social
security adjudications were governed by the APA because the Supreme Court
had "refused to decide" whether social security disability claims are governed
by the APA. Id. at 1026 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409 (1971)).
Congress stated explicitly that social security hearings in which the Secretary
is represented by counsel are covered by the EAJA. H.R. REP. No. 120, supra
note 49, at 10, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws at 138-39.
104. Escobar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at 1027.
105. Id
106. Id. The court noted that the government could offer no other types of
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After analyzing the EAJA's legislative history and pur-
poses, the Ninth Circuit considered and rejected the govern-
ment's two main arguments. The government had argued that,
because the Supreme Court in Marcello v. Bonds'0 7 held that
the INA governs deportation proceedings, the EAJA should not
apply to deportation proceedings. 0 8 The court discounted this
argument, concluding that Marcello only held that the INA su-
perseded the APA's hearing procedures when the two Acts di-
verged.'0 9 The court also rejected the government's argument
that section 292110 of the INA should be construed as a provi-
sion precluding fee shifting. The government argued that be-
cause the EAJA did not apply to other fee shifting statutes, L
the EAJA should not apply to INA proceedings. The court
held that section 292 of the INA did not preclude fee shifting,"
noting that the section 292 did not forbid attorney fees to aliens
in all situations; rather the section stated only that indigent
aliens were not entitled to appointed counsel as a matter of
hearings besides deportation and social security that met the definition of
§ 554 yet were not governed by the APA. Because the government includes
social security proceedings under EAJA's coverage, see Department of Health
and Human Services, Implementation of the Equal Access to Justice Act in
Agency Proceedings, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,311, 23,312 (1987) (codified at 45 C.F.R
§§ 13.1-13.30), the court could find no reason for treating deportation proceed-
ings differently. Escobar Ruis, 838 F.2d at 1027.
107. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
108. Escobar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at 1025.
109. Id In any event, the court ruled that the crucial distinction between
the INA and APA - the role of the hearing officer - had since vanished.
New regulations under the INA now made the hearing officer's role indistin-
guishable under the two statutes. Because the hearing provisions of the two
statutes are presently "fundamentally identical," the court ruled that there
was "no question" that deportation hearings were similar to hearings con-
ducted under the APA. Id.
It is puzzling why the court bothered distinguishing Marcello at all. Once
the court decided to use a functional standard, it does not matter whether the
INA supersedes or replaces the APA. All that is important is whether the de-
portation procedures are the functional equivalent of the APA procedures.
See infra Part III.
110. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text for a description of this
section of the INA.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) begins: "Except as otherwise specifically pro-
vided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party... fees and other
expenses ... incurred by that party in any civil action. . . ." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (emphasis added). This portion of the statute means
that the EAJA applies to all civil actions except statutes that already have fee
shifting provisions. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 30, at 18, 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmN. NEWS at 4997.
112. Escobar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at 1028.
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right."13 Hence, the court held that the EAJA applied to depor-
tation proceedings.3 4
B. CLARKE v. INS
In Clarke v. INS," 5 the Third Circuit reached a contrary
result than the Escobar Ruiz court, finding that the EAJA does
not apply to deportation proceedings. 1 6 The Clarke court re-
jected the appellant's application for attorney fees, stating that
the EAJA's legislative history, coupled with canons of statutory
construction, compelled the result. 1 7 The court first noted that
the EAJA would not cover deportation proceedings if section
504 of the Act required the APA to govern agency proceedings
because the INA governs deportation proceedings." s
The court then interpreted the correct meaning of section
504's language. It relied first on canons of statutory interpreta-
tion, noting that statutes waiving sovereign immunity from fee
claims must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign."19
Hence, in choosing between the technical "governed by" inter-
pretation versus the functional "defined by" interpretation, the
court felt compelled to limit application of the EAJA to those
adjudications governed by section 554.12 0
113. Id. The court reasoned that the INA committee report discussed § 292
in the context of the rights aliens have in deportation proceedings. Id Thus,
§ 292 was not a proscription against fee shifting, but a proscription against ap-
pointed government counsel. Id.
114. Id. at 1030. After holding that the EAJA does apply to deportation
proceedings, however, the court ruled that Escobar Ruiz was not entitled to
fees under the Act because he was not a prevailing party. Id. at 1029. Three
judges dissented from the court's opinion, arguing that because the court ruled
Escobar Ruiz was not a prevailing party, the court should not have ruled on
whether the EAJA applied to deportation proceedings. Id. at 1030-31 (Blaine
Anderson, Beezer, and Brunetti, JJ., dissenting).
115. 904 F.2d 172 (3d Cir. 1990).
116. Id- at 178. The case arose in 1988 when the INS began -deportation
proceedings against Clarke. After the immigration judge dismissed the
charges, Clarke applied for attorney fees under the EAJA. Id. at 173.
117. Id. at 178.
118. Id. at 174.
119. Id. at 175 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983)). As-
suming that the statute should be construed strictly in favor of the United
States, the court found the Escobar Ruiz interpretation of "an adjudication
under section 554" "strained and untenable." Id.
120. Id. The court noted that the "defined under" interpretation used by
the Escobar Ruiz court had been criticized in other cases. Id. at 175-76 (citing
St. Louis Fuel & Supply Co. v. FERC, 890 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that proceedings challenging a price regulation remedial order was not an
adversary adjudication within the meaning of the EAJA); Owens v. Brock, 860
F.2d 1363, 1365 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that workers' compensation hearings
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The Clarke court also found support for its position in the
EAJA's legislative history. The Third Circuit noted that Con-
gress did not amend the statute in 1985 to include deportation
proceedings, even though the United States Attorney General
in 1984 promulgated regulations stating that the EAJA did not
apply to deportation proceedings.' 12 Further, even though Con-
gress may not have implicitly ratified the Attorney General's
interpretation of the EAJA, the court could not conclude that
Congress intended to overturn that regulation without Con-
gress's affirmative action. 22
The court made three other arguments to support its posi-
tion. First, it ruled that section 292 of the INA precluded fee
shifting. s23 The court did not explain this ruling, noting only
that legislative intent was ambiguous, and that the canon of
limited waivers of statutory immunity demanded resolving the
ambiguity in the government's favor.24 Second, because Con-
gress had acted affirmatively to include proceedings that courts
previously thought the EAJA did not cover,25 the Clarke court
was reluctant to imply legislative intent to include deportation
conducted under the Federal Employee's Compensation Act are not adversary
adjudications under the EAJA). For a more detailed discussion of SL Louis
Fuel and Owens, see supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
121. Clarke, 904 F.2d at 177. The attorney general regulations excluding
deportation proceedings can be found in Implementation of the Equal Access
to Justice Act in Department of Justice Administrative Proceedings, 28 C.F.R.
§ 24.103 (1990).
122. Clarke, 904 F.2d at 177. In other words, the court suggested that Con-
gress had acted to remedy other mistaken interpretations of the EAJA but
had not acted to clear up the Attorney General's regulation excluding deporta-
tion proceedings from EAJA coverage. Therefore, the court should not imply
legislative intent when Congress had acted affirmatively in previous cases. Id
at 178.
123. Id. at 177. The court accepted as "plausible" Clarke's argument that
§ 292 only precluded appointed counsel for indigent aliens and was not a bar
against fee-shifting. Id It also concluded, however, that Congress did not "in-
tend to disturb its longstanding proscription against government funding of
counsel for aliens in deportation proceedings" when it passed the EAJA. Id
Because the court could find no evidence of definitive legislative intent, the
court refused to resolve the ambiguity in Clarke's favor, especially given the
"limited nature of statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity." Id.
124. Id.
125. In 1985, Congress legislatively overruled Fidelity Constr. Co. v. United
States, 700 F.2d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1983), by amending 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C) (the
definition section of "adversary adjudication") to include some administrative
hearings under § 6 of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. § 605 (1988).
Equal Access to Justice Act, Extension and Amendment, Pub. L. No. 99-80
§ 1(c)(2), 99 Stat. 183, 184 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(iii) (1988)). In
1986 Congress amended the same section to include hearings under the Pro-
gram Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3812 (1988). Omni-
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proceedings. 2 6 Third, the court held that a bright line rule
should determine the coverage of the EAJA;127 absent such a
rule, courts would have to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether the EAJA applied to a particular administrative
proceeding2s
In holding that the EAJA did not apply to deportation pro-
ceedings,2 9 the Clarke court rejected the Escobar Ruiz court's
analysis. It concluded that the 1980 conference committee re-
port's use of the words "defined under" was not important, be-
cause there was no indication that the conference committee
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509 § 6103(c), 100 Stat.
1874, 1948 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(iii) (1988)).
126. Clarke, 904 F.2d at 178.
127. Id.
128. I& (arguing a functional interpretation would force courts to decide,
on a case-by-case basis, "'whether a particular proceeding is close enough to a
section 554 hearing to be an adjudication 'as defined by' that section or 'of the
type referred to' in it'" (quoting St. Louis Fuel & Supply Co. v. FERC, 890
F.2d 446, 451 (D.C. Cir 1989))).
129. Using basically the same reasoning as the Third Circuit, the Eleventh
Circuit in Ardestani v. INS also held that the EAJA did not apply to deporta-
tion proceedings. 904 F.2d 1505, 1515 (11th Cir. 1990).
In denying Ardestani's claim for attorney fees under the EAJA, the Elev-
enth Circuit began with the presumption that the intent of the legislature can
be found in the plain meaning of the statute. Id at 1508. In addition, the court
relied on the canon of construction that courts should construe waivers of sov-
ereign immunity strictly in favor of the sovereign. Id at 1509. Because the
stricter version of the statute would use the "governed by" interpretation of
"under section 554" the court used that interpretation. I& at 1514.
The court then reasoned that because Congress knew that the Attorney
General regulations did not include deportation proceedings in the hearings
covered by the EAJA when it reenacted the EAJA and had clarified the
EAJA's coverage in response to legislative and judicial interpretations, the
court should rule that the EAJA does not cover deportation proceedings. Id
at 1512. In addition, the court ruled the Attorney General's interpretation
should be given deference. Id at 1512-13 (quoting Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). The Attorney
General's interpretation that deportation proceedings are not covered by the
EAJA was deemed a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 1513.
Finally, the Ardestani court ruled that § 292 of the INA precluded fees.
Id The court interpreted the parenthetical phrase "at no expense to the gov-
ernment" as a complete bar to fees against the government. Id After assum-
ing that § 292 barred fee-shifting, the court argued that the EAJA could not
cover deportation proceedings because a specific statute (i.e., the INA) cannot
be nullified or controlled by a general statute (i.e., the EAJA). Id. The court
concluded that the "governed by" standard should apply to the EAJA. Conse-
quently, the holding of the Supreme Court in Marcello that deportation is gov-
erned by the INA constrained the court to hold that the EAJA did not apply
to deportation proceedings.
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understood the implications of that phrase. 30 It also disagreed
with the Escobar Ruiz court's analogy of deportation proceed-
ings to social security proceedings. The Supreme Court stated
that social security proceedings did not vary from the APA's re-
quirements.13' Moreover, the legislative history suggested that
Congress believed the APA governed social security hear-
ings. 32 Therefore, the Escobar Ruiz court's analogy to deporta-
tion proceedings was faulty.'-
III. DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS ARE WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF THE EAJA
The Escobar Ruiz court correctly held that the EAJA ap-
plies to deportation proceedings. The EAJA's language, "an ad-
judication under section 554," is ambiguous - "under" can be
subjected to two different interpretations. 34 The legislative
history of the EAJA demonstrates that Congress intended that
the EAJA apply to a proceeding that is the functional
equivalent to an APA hearing.1'5 Finally, applying the EAJA
to deportation proceedings fulfills the EAJA's purpose of en-
abling individuals to litigate against the government without
the expense of litigation as a deterrent. 36 Hence, courts should
interpret the phrase, "an adjudication under section 554," to
mean an adjudication "as defined by" section 554 of the APA.
A. SECTION 292 OF THE INA DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE
EAJA's APPLICATION TO DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS
Because the EAJA does not apply to other fee shifting stat-
utes, 3 7 a threshold issue is whether section 292 of the INA is a
provision that prohibits fee shifting. Section 292 states that
aliens can be represented by counsel at "no expense to the gov-
ernment.' 138 The Clarke court argued that this language pre-
cludes fee shifting.139 This interpretation is erroneous. Neither
130. C/arke, 904 F.2d at 176 (citing Owens v. Brock, 860 F.2d 1363, 1366 (6th
Cir. 1988)).
131. I& at 177 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409 (1971)).
132. Id.
133. I& at 176-77.
134. See infra Part III. B. 1. Because the statute is ambiguous, looking to
the legislative history and statutory purpose is justifiable. Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984).
135. See infra Part III. B. 2.
136. See infra Part III. B. 3.
137. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
138. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988).
139. Clarke v. INS, 904 F.2d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 1990).
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the INA nor the committee reports indicate that section 292 is a
fee shifting provision.140 Rather, the language of this section
merely states that, although aliens have a right to counsel, they
do not have a right to government appointed counsel; it says
nothing about fee shifting. Application of the EAJA to depor-
tation proceedings does not contravene the policy underlying
the INA because the EAJA does not give indigents the right to
government paid counsel, but merely awards fees to any alien
who prevails in an adversary proceeding against the INS.141
Because section 292 is not a fee shifting provision, the INA does
not preclude the EAJA's application to deportation
proceedings.
140. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1988). The committee report discusses § 292
when it describes the rights aliens have in deportation hearings. H.R. REP.
No. 1365, supra note 20, at 57, 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 1712.
If Congress meant to prohibit fee shifting, Congress surely could have found a
better place in the statute to do so than in the context of delineating alien
rights.
141. Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc). The
INS itself has rejected a broad reading of the parenthetical language "at no ex-
pense to the government" as a general bar against government funded legal
assistance for aliens. INS regulations state that the immigration judge shall
advise the alien about her right to be represented by an attorney, at no ex-
pense to the government, and of the availability of "free legal services pro-
grams." 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (1990) (provision for exclusion hearings); accord 8
C.F.R. § 242.16(a) (1990) (provision for deportation proceedings) (emphasis ad-
ded). The INS, at the time it issued the above regulations, stated that it found
"no conflict between the limitation in section 292 of the Act and the availabil-
ity of free legal services rendered by those organizations which are recipients
of funds provided by certain Federal agencies or the Legal Services Corpora-
tion." Notification to Aliens of the Availability of Free Legal Services Pro-
grams, 44 Fed. Reg. 4652 (1979) (amendment codified at 8 C.F.R. § 242.2)
(emphasis added). Likewise, the possibility of EAJA fee awards paid by gov-
ernment agencies does not conflict with the parenthetical language of § 292 be-
cause the phrase "at no expense to the government" is not a general bar
against government payment of attorney fees.
Assuming for the sake of argument that § 292 of the INA and the EAJA
might conflict, courts should if possible interpret the statutes so that they can
co-exist. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) ("when two statutes
are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly ex-
pressed congressional intent to the contrary, to regard each as effective" (em-
phasis added)); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976)
(courts should interpret statutes to give effect to both if congressional pur-
poses can still be met). Section 292's purpose is to bar government-appointed
counsel. Escobar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at 1028. The EAJA's purpose is to encourage
litigation against unjustified government action. See supra Part I. B. 2. b. Be-
cause the statutes can co-exist without destroying either statute's purpose,
§ 292 should not be construed to bar EAJA fees in deportation cases.
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B. THE EAJA's SCOPE INCLUDES DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS
1. The Statutory Language of the EAJA is Ambiguous
In section 504 of the EAJA, the phrase "an adjudication
under" the APA is ambiguous. 142 Without legislative context,
"under" might connote "pursuant to" or "subject to."'1 43 The
term is not, however, self-defining.144 For example, "under"
can also mean "in accordance with" or "as defined by."'1 45
Thus, given its ambiguity, courts should interpret "under" in
light of the EAJA's legislative history and purposes.146 When
interpreted in this context, "under" means "in accordance
with" or "as defined by."'1 4 7
142. Among other definitions, "under" has been defined to mean both
"subject to" (the C/arke court's definition) and "in accordance with" (the Esco-
bar Ruiz court's definition). 18 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 950 (2d ed.
1989) [hereinafter OX2FORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY]; WEBSTER'S THImD NEw IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2487 (1986) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY].
The ACUS also thought the phrase "under section 554" was ambiguous. 46
Fed. Reg. 32,901 (1981) ("Exactly what proceedings are encompassed by [the
phrase 'under section 544'] has long been a difficult legal question, and we pro-
posed a broad interpretation of the reference to adjudications 'under section
554' largely to avoid protracted debate about whether particular proceedings
fall within its ambit.").
143. OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 142, at 949; WEBSTER'S DIC-
TIONARY, supra note 142, at 2487.
144. For example, The Oxford English Dictionary offers 25 different defini-
tions for the preposition "under." See OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra
note 142, at 947-51.
145. IMi at 950; WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 142, at 2487.
146. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) ("[w]here... resolution of a
question of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we
look first to the statutory language and then to the legislative history if the
statutory language is unclear"); Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217
(1984) (when the statutory language has several possible interpretations, the
court's duty is "to find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to be
imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with its
scheme and with the general purposes that Congress manifested" (quoting
NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957))); Dickerson v. New Banner
Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 118 (1983) (court should interpret statutory language in
light of congressional purposes); Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336
U.S. 198, 201 (1949) (statutory words and definitions should not be read "in a
mechanical fashion [which would] destroy one of the major purposes [of the
statute]"). Even if the statutory language were unambiguous, the purpose of
the statute should be considered to see if the statutory language frustrates con-
gressional intent. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983).
147. See infra Part III. B. 2.-3. This functional use of the word "under" in-
cludes deportation proceeding within the scope of the EAJA.
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2. The EAJA's Legislative History Supports a Functional
Approach
a. Conference Report
The original conference report used the phrase "defined
under" to explain the scope of Section 504;148 thus, the Escobar
Ruiz court ruled that Congress intended "under section 554" to
mean "as defined by" section 554.149 As the Clarke court ar-
gued, however, Congress could have failed to recognize the im-
plications of a "defined under" interpretation. 50
The same conference report, however, better supports the
Escobar Ruiz court's position that the EAJA applies to deporta-
tion cases. The conference report, in the same section that in-
cluded the "defined under" language, indicates that an
administrative hearing becomes an adversary adjudication
when the government takes a position in the adjudication.' 51
148. H.R. REP. No. 1434, supra note 94, at 23, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws at 5012.
149. Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc). The
court's use of the ACUS model rules also provides some support for the court's
position. The agency's interpretation is entitled to deference because the
EAJA itself requires agencies to consult with the ACUS before promulgating
rules for implementing the EAJA. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1988). However,
the ACUS' interpretation is of questionable value, because it is premised on
the argument that a broad definition would avoid litigation over whether the
EAJA applies. See 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900, 32,901 (1981). The ACUS interpreta-
tion has not reduced litigation over the scope of the EAJA. There is little rea-
son to give weight to the interpretation because the desired result has not been
fulfilled. Other legislative history also supports interpreting "under" to mean
"as defined by." An earlier version of the EAJA had used the words "subject
to section 554," see S. 265, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (bill as originally passed
by Senate), but that language was later changed to "under section 554." See
Small Business Export Expansion Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 203(a)(1),
94 Stat. 2321, 2325 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i) (1988).
"Subject to" means "governed by;" but "under" is susceptible to more varied
interpretations. See supra Part HI. B. 1. This substitution also suggests that
Congress rejected the narrow interpretation of "under section 554" that the
INS suggested and embraced the larger, less hypertechnical interpretation.
150. At least one court has argued that the conference report's use of "de-
fined under" provides no more than "ephemeral" support for the Escobar Ruiz
court's position. Owens v. Brock, 860 F.2d 1363, 1366 (6th Cir. 1988). The
Owens court reasoned that: "There is no evidence in the legislative history to
indicate that the conference committee understood the term 'defined under' to
include within EAJA coverage those proceedings that are not governed by sec-
tion 554 but instead are merely conducted in a similar manner." Id
151. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1434, supra note 94, at 23, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 5012. The conference report states:
The Senate bill defines adversary adjudication as one where the
agency takes a position through representation through counsel or
otherwise .... The conference substitute defines adversary adjudica-
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When the government argues against the interests of a particu-
lar individual, as it does in an agency adjudication, only that in-
dividual will bear the consequences of the agency's decision.152
Thus, an agency adjudication is different from rulemaking pro-
ceedings in which the agency promulgates regulations that ap-
ply to the public at large. In agency adjudications, the
individual's battle to vindicate her rights will likely be long and
costly.153 Congress intended to give an individual a meaningful
chance to defend her interests against the government when it
has decided to take unjustified action against her.'- Congress
intended that the individual get this chance when the govern-
ment takes a position in the proceeding, not when the APA
governs the hearing. Therefore, the EAJA should apply to de-
portation proceedings.
b. The 1985 Amendments
1. Congress Expressly Included Some Adjudications Not
Governed by the APA
In two 1985 amendments, Congress indicated that its con-
cern was not with whether the APA governed a particular
hearing, but with whether the hearing was adversarial,
whether counsel represented the government, and whether a
party suffered the burden and expense of an agency hearing.
When Congress reenacted the EAJA, it rejected a case that
used the "governed by" interpretation of the EAJA. 5 5 In that
tion as an agency adjudication defined under the [APA] where the
agency takes a position through counsel or otherwise. It is intended
that this definition precludes an award in a situation where an agency
... does not take a position in the adjudication. If, however, the
agency does take a position at some point in the adjudication, the ad-
judication would then become adversarial.
Id. (emphasis added). The government does take a position in deportation pro-
ceedings. It argues that the alien should be deported.
152. This is what Congress was referring to when it said that it wanted to
limit fee awards to those situations where "concrete interest[s]" are at stake.
See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 30, at 14, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 4993.
153. Id. at 5-6, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4984 (stating that
the premise behind the EAJA is that vindicating one's rights in suits against
the government is expensive and many people lack the financial resources to
fight substantially unjust government action).
154. See supra Part I. B. 2. b.
155. See Fidelity Constr. Co. v. United States, 700 F.2d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(holding that contract appeals governed by the Contract Disputes Act (CDA)
are not covered by the EAJA, because CDA proceedings are not subject to
§ 554 of the APA). When Congress reenacted the EAJA it legislatively over-
ruled this decision. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Extension and Amend-
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case, the court had held that the EAJA did not cover contract
appeals.1' Congress expressly included such appeals within
the scope of the EAJA157 even though the Contract Disputes
Act, not the APA, governs contract appeals. Congress also in-
cluded social security proceedings within the scope of the
EAJA. 15 This inclusion strongly supports applying the EAJA
to deportation proceedings as well. Although the APA might
not govern social security proceedings,159 Congress nevertheless
stated in the 1985 legislative history that the EAJA applies to
social security proceedings as long as counsel represents the in-
terests of the United States 60 and the government advocated
ment, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 1(c)(2), 99 Stat. 183, 184 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(b)(1)(C)(ii) (1988) ("adversary adjudication means... any appeal of a de-
cision made pursuant to section 6 of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978"); H.R.
REP. No. 120, supra note 49, at 15, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
144. The reason Congress amended the statute was to preserve people's option
to appeal their contract dispute either to the Claims Court or the agency
board. I& Without this amendment, Congress feared people would only ap-
peal to the Claims Court because EAJA fees were available there but not at
the agency level. Id Although Congress expressed this rationale for passing
the amendment, the amendment also shows that Congress was not terribly
concerned about whether an agency hearing was governed by the APA. In-
stead, it was concerned with whether people underwent the burden and ex-
pense of an adversarial hearing.
156. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
157. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(ii) (1988) (stating any appeal made pursu-
ant to the Contract Disputes Act is covered by the EAJA).
When Congress reenacted the EAJA in 1985, it consistently expressed dis-
approval of the restrictive interpretations given to the EAJA by agencies and
courts. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 49, at 9-10, 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND ADMIN. NEws at 137-38.
158. H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 49, at 10, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 138-39 (stating Social Security Administration hearings are cov-
ered by the EAJA when the agency's interests are represented by counsel).
159. See generally Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 408-09 (1971) (refus-
ing to decide if the APA or Social Security Act (SSA) applies in cases where
plaintiff claimed the SSA hearing procedures violated due process); Keegan v.
Heckler, 744 F.2d 972, 975 (3d Cir. 1984) (assuming without deciding that the
APA evidentiary rules apply to SSA hearings); Ginsburg v. Richardson, 436
F.2d 1146, 1148 n.1 (3d Cir.) (stating the court did not need to determine if the
APA supersedes the SSA with respect to judicial review of final agency deci-
sions, because the standards of review are identical), cert denied, 402 U.S. 976
(1971).
160. See H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 49, at 10, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 138 ("As enacted in 1980, the Act covers 'adversary adjudica-
tions' - i.e., an adjudication under section 554 of title 5, United States Code 'in
which the position of the United States is represented by counsel or other-
wise."' (emphasis in original)); id. at 10, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 138-39 (stating Social Security Administration hearings are covered by
the EAJA when the agency's interests are represented by counsel). The 1980
legislative history also shows that Congress was not concerned with whether
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its position in the hearing.161 Thus, Congress wanted the EAJA
to apply regardless of whether the APA governed an
adjudication.
2. Congress Did Not Implicitly Ratify the Attorney
General's Regulations Excluding Deportation
Proceedings
In 1985, Congress did not amend the EAJA to include de-
portation proceedings despite allegedly knowing that the ex-
isting Attorney General regulations excluded deportation
hearings.162 This failure does not, however, prove that Con-
gress intended deportation proceedings to be outside the scope
of the EAJA. Congress did not explain why it did not add de-
portation proceedings to the EAJA, nor did it expressly state
its intent to exclude deportation proceedings. Such legislative
silence is not reliable as an interpretive tool.la3 Indeed the re-
the APA governed social security proceedings, but only with whether the gov-
ernment had taken a position in the adjudication. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1434,
supra note 94, at 23, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS at 5012 ("It is in-
tended that this definition precludes an award in a situation where an agency,
e.g., the Social Security Administratiom, does not take a position in the adjudi-
cation. If, however, the agency does take a position at some point in the adju-
dication, the adjudication would then become adversarial." (emphasis added)).
161. H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 49, at 10, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 138 (stating that if the Social Security Administration takes a po-
sition during the adjudication, the proceeding was an adversary adjudication
within the meaning of the EAJA).
162. Clarke v. INS, 904 F.2d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 1990).
163. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 121 (1940). The Court noted
To explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself
sheds no light is to venture into speculative unrealities .... Various
considerations of parliamentary tactics and strategy might be sug-
gested as reasons for the inaction of... Congress, but they would only
be sufficient to indicate that we walk on quicksand when we try to
find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal
principle.
Id.; see also R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STAT-
UTEs 181-82 (1975)
(Even where [Congress] is fully aware of [an administrative interpre-
tation], there are often reasons other than approval why a legislature
remains silent or inactive .... There could hardly be less reputable
legislative material than legislative silence.., no court should feel in-
hibited, merely by virtue of legislative silence or inaction, in cor-
recting what it conceives to have been a faulty [administrative]
interpretation.);
W. ESKRIDGE, JR. & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 772 (1988)
(Things the legislature fails to do (inaction) far outnumber the things
it actually does (action). Both state and federal courts have generally
been leery of relying on such inaction as rejection of amendments to a
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enactment history does not indicate that Congress was aware of
the Attorney General regulations.164 Moreover, Congress did
not modify the pertinent language, "under section 554," when it
reenacted the EAJA.165 Because Congress did not change this
language,166 courts cannot imply a legislative intent to exclude
bill, failure to repudiate administrative or judicial interpretations of a
statute, failure to act on a companion or rival bill, or failure to amend
a statute in a subsequent bill.);
H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocEss 1395 (tent. ed. 1958) ("If a legisla-
ture were under a duty to consider every question of public policy which is
mooted in a court or elsewhere and to declare itself one way or the other, inac-
tion would obviously be significant. But is there such a duty? Would it be tol-
erable if there were?").
164. See generally H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 49, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 132 (no reference to the Attorney General regulations). In
SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978), the Supreme Court held that the SEC's use
of its summary suspension power was not given congressional approval merely
because Congress reenacted the Securities Exchange Act after a Senate com-
mittee stated its approval of the Securities Exchange Commission's practice.
Id. at 119-20. The Court stated that the committee report was not sufficient in
itself to indicate widespread awareness of the SEC's construction of the stat-
ute. Id at 121. Thus, reenactment of a statute, even after a committee report
notes the existence of an agency practice and approves of it, is not always
enough to infer that Congress ratified an agency interpretation. In the present
case, the House report did not indicate awareness of the Attorney General's
regulations. Because congressional awareness of the Attorney General regula-
tions is lower than that in the Sloan case, Congress cannot be presumed to
have implicitly ratified the regulations.
165. The present issue is analogous to the Supreme Court's analysis in
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566-67 (1988). The Pierce court had to de-
cide what the term "substantially justified" meant in the EAJA. The 1985
House report said that: "Because in 1980 Congress rejected a standard of 'rea-
sonably justified' in favor of 'substantially justified,' the test must be more
than mere reasonableness." H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 49, at 9, 1985 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 138. The Court held that this report's defini-
tion of "substantially justified" was not an authoritative interpretation of the
EAJA. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566-67. The report's definition was not an authorita-
tive interpretation of what the original EAJA meant because only courts can
say what an enacted statute means. Id at 566. The statement was not an au-
thoritative expression of what the ninety-ninth Congress intended,
because it is not an explanation of any language that the 1985 Com-
mittee drafted, because on its face it accepts the 1980 meaning of the
terms as subsisting, and because there is no indication whatever in the
text or even the legislative history of the 1985 reenactment that Con-
gress thought it was doing anything insofar as the present issue is con-
cerned except reenacting and making permanent the 1980 legislation.
Id. at 566-67.
Likewise, the Attorney General's regulation is not the definitive interpre-
tation of the 1980 statute because only courts can give final interpretations of
statutes. In addition, the regulation is not an authoritative interpretation of
the 1985 EAJA because Congress did not change the phrase "an adjudication
under section 554" to show it wanted to broaden or narrow the EAJA's scope.
166. See generally H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 49, at 14, 1985 U.S. CODE
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deportation proceedings.167
3. The Legislative Purposes are Furthered by Including
Deportation Proceedings Within the Scope of the
EAJA
In addition to the legislative history, the purposes of the
EAJA also demand that the EAJA apply to deportation pro-
ceedings. 168 Applying the EAJA to deportation proceedings
will further the EAJA's policies of allowing individuals to fight
unjustified government action without fear of expensive attor-
ney fees as well as that of deterring unwarranted government
action. 169
The legislative history is replete with evidence indicating
that Congress intended to give individuals access to agencies
and their quasi-judicial decisions.170 When Congress used the
phrase "adversary adjudication," its primary concern was with
whether individuals had borne the expense of a hearing and
had a concrete interest at stake in the proceeding, and with
whether counsel had represented government interests.171
Congress was not concerned whether the APA governed the
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 142-43 (list of amendments Congress made to the
EAJA - an amendment of the phrase "under section 554" was not on the
list).
167. Cf Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566-67 (reasoning that a House committee's re-
port that stated "substantial justification" means a higher standard than rea-
sonableness did not change the meaning of the EAJA because Congress did
not change the words "substantial justification" to show it wanted a different
standard). Likewise, Congress did not amend the phrase "an adjudication
under section 554" to show it intended to broaden or narrow the EAJA's
scope. Thus, the Attorney General's regulation does not aid the interpretation
of the EAJA because Congress did not amend the statute to show it wanted
the meaning of "under section 554" to change from the original meaning in-
tended in 1980.
168. Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
169. See supra Part I. B. 2. b.
170. See id.
171. See e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 30, at 14, 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADIIN. NEWS at 4993 (The EAJA covers only adversary adjudications
because Congress wanted to "limit the award of [attorney] fees to situations
where participants have a concrete interest at stake but nevertheless may be
deterred from asserting or defending that interest because of the time and ex-
pense involved in pursuing administrative remedies"); H.R. CONF. REP. No.
1434, supra note 94, at 21, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5010 ("An
adversarial adjudication is one in which the agency position is represented by
counsel or otherwise."); H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 49, at 10, 1985 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 138-39 ("While, generally, Social Security ad-
ministrative hearings remain outside the scope of this statute, those in which
the Secretary is represented are covered by the [EAJA].").
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agency hearing, because individuals can have a stake in the
agency outcome and go to great expense to influence the out-
come even if the APA does not govern the hearing. 72
Moreover, Congress passed the EAJA in response to the
Supreme Court's Alyeska Pipeline decision. 73 Thus, the EAJA
reflects Congress's attempt to codify the private attorney gen-
eral rule.174 As such, Congress demonstrated its policy of fur-
thering the public interest and protecting individual rights by
encouraging poorer individuals to protect their rights by bring-
ing (or defending) suits that cost might otherwise preclude.175
Given this policy, Congress would not want the individual's
ability to contest government action to depend on the fortuity
of whether the APA governed the agency proceeding. Such a
result would be anomalous.
Extending the EAJA to deportation proceedings also ful-
fills its policy of deterring agency overzealousness.1 76 INS at-
torneys are extremely aggressive, often opposing defenses to
deportation regardless of the merits of the case.17T The INS ad-
ministrators might reevaluate their harsh policies if substantial
fee awards in EAJA adjudications reduced their budget,178 a re-
sult Congress intended. 7 9 In addition, individuals must chal-
lenge the decisions of immigration judges and the Board of
Immigration Appeals because these decisions often are
wrong. 80 Finally, aliens have a cultural disadvantage in the
172. Deportation proceedings, for example, are often long and costly. Esco-
bar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at 1026.
173. H.R. REP. NO. 1418, supra note 30, at 6, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
mnv. NEws at 4985.
174. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
175. Id- at 6, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 4984 ("[t]he purpose
of the [EAJA] is to reduce the deterrents [to litigation against the government]
by entitling certain prevailing parties to recover an award of attorney fees");
id- at 10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmw. NEws at 4988-89 ("[t]he [EAJA]
rests on the premise that a party who chooses to litigate an issue against the
Government is not only representing his or her own vested interest but is also
refining and formulating public policy"); see also supra Part I. B. 2. b. (one
purpose of EAJA is to aid victims of unjustified government action who might
be deterred by the cost of litigation of defending themselves).
176. Stern, supra note 2, at 1471.
177. Id- The reason for this aggressive stance is that during the Reagan ad-
mini tration the INS began a new recruitment policy to attract many aggres-
sive trial attorneys, many from the Justice Department, to prosecute
deportation cases. Id.
178. Id
179. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
180. Stern, supra note 2, at 1465.
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American administrative process.1 81 The possibility of receiving
EAJA fees when the government acts without substantial justi-
fication allows aliens a level playing field in defending against
the government's suits.18 2
Finally, a broad reading of the EAJA in light of its pur-
poses comports with Supreme Court precedent.183 In Sullivan
v. Hudson, the Court faced the issue of whether the EAJA's
term "civil action" included proceedings on remand from court
or precluded all proceedings except those occurring in a court
of law.i s4 Although the Court could reasonably have inter-
preted "civil action" to include only proceedings in court, it re-
fused to interpret the phrase so narrowly.'i a The Court
concluded that such an interpretation would frustrate the
EAJA's purpose of diminishing the deterrent effects of litiga-
tion against the government.1 86 Similarly, courts should con-
strue broadly the phrase "under section 554" to achieve the
EAJA's purpose. 8 7
181. Id at 1470. For example, many people who are seeking asylum do not
speak English; nor do they understand the United States legal system and
their right to apply for asylum. Id at 1470 n.71.
182. Attorneys may be attracted by the possibility of recovering fees and
underfunded legal aid organizations will be able to take cases because they
will be given fee awards. I.
183. Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989). In Sullivan, the Supreme
Court read the statute in light of its purpose. Id at 890. The issue was
whether a social security claimant was entitled to fees under the EAJA for
representation provided during administrative proceedings on remand from
the district court. Id at 879. The Court had to decide what the term "civil ac-
tion" meant with regard to the EAJA. I& at 883-84. The social security ad-
ministrator argued that "civil action" only meant proceedings that occurred in
a court of law. I& at 891. The Court rejected that narrow view, holding that
administrative proceedings can be so intimately tied with judicial proceedings
that they can be considered part of the "civil action" for purposes of a fee
award. Id, at 892. "Civil action" can include administrative proceedings neces-
sary to the completion of a civil action. Id.
184. Id at 879. The Supreme Court noted that the administrative proceed-
ing required by remand was critical to vindicate claimants' rights. Id at 889.
The Court correctly realized that to allow fees for work in court but not on
remand would create an incentive for attorneys to abandon clients before the
remand proceeding. Id at 889-90.
185. Id The Court wrote: "we must endeavor to interpret the [EAJA] in
light of the statutory provisions it was designed to effectuate." Id The Court
went on to quote the purpose behind the EAJA: "'to diminish the deterrent
effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action.'" Id at
890 (quoting purpose of Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481,
§ 202(c)(1), 94 Stat. 2321, 2325 (quoted purpose not codified in United States
Cede)).
186. Id
187. Like the term "civil action," "under" could be defined narrowly to
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C. CANONS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The Clarke court relied on the canon that waivers of gov-
ernment immunity from fee claims must be strictly con-
strued.188 This position is flawed. Neither Ckrke, nor any of
the cases it cites, provides any reason for following this canon
with such rigidity.8 9 Presumably, canons are intended to fur-
ther some underlying policy. 90 Thus, to justify its application,
the court must explain why the EAJA's waiver of sovereign im-
munity should be construed strictly in this case.
The court's failure to state such a reason probably can be
explained by noting that the canon has lost much of its original
rationale.19' The canon, however, still adheres to the old notion
that as few constraints as possible should burden the sover-
eign's freedom to decide how best to serve the public inter-
est.192 Use of the canon in EAJA cases does not, however,
advance the canon's rationale. Superficially, the canon's policy
could apply by ensuring that the government is not burdened
lessen the government's susceptibility to liability. To do so, however, would be
contrary to the EAJA's purpose. To construe "under" to mean "governed by"
would create the anomalous result of attorneys who would be willing to repre-
sent claimants in APA adjudications but not in adjudications governed by
other statutes. Claimants in proceedings not governed by the APA would still
be deterred from contesting unjustified government action. Therefore, the
phrase "under section 554" should be construed broadly to effectuate the pur-
pose of the EAJA.
In addition to the EAJA, the Supreme Court has consistently construed
other fee shifting statutes broadly. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizen's Council, 478 U.S. 546, 558 (1986) (rejecting contention that the word
"action" in the fee shifting provision of the Clean Air Act should be read nar-
rowly to include only judicial proceedings); New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v.
Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 62-63 (1980) (interpreting fee shifting provision of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 broadly to find attorney fees available for attorney services
performed in state administrative proceedings). The Court has ruled that a
broad interpretation best gives effect to policies underlying these fee shifting
statutes. See, e.g., Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 559-60 (broad construction of
statute is crucial to vindicate a litigant's rights).
188. Clarke v. INS, 904 F.2d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 1990).
189. See id-
190. See 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 62.01, at 111 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1972) (canon that statutes in derogation of sov-
ereignty should be construed strictly is based on policy of preserving efficient
government functioning); W. ESKRIDGE, JR. & P. FRICKEY, supra note 163, at
656.
191. W. ESKRIDGE, JR. & P. FICKEY, supra note 163, at 657 (canon is based
on old idea that a sovereign cannot be sued or regulated without its consent,
but because absolute immunity of the sovereign has declined substantially in
recent years, the canon has lost much of its original rationale).
192. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 190, § 62.01, at 111; W. ESKuRDGE, JR. & P.
FRiCKEY, supra note 163, at 657.
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with law suits. This analysis, however, ignores the EAJA's fun-
damental goals of purposefully encouraging suits against the
government in order to make the government work more effi-
ciently and fairly, and deterring the government from operat-
ing unjustly.193 In short, Congress thought the best way to
serve the public interest was not for the government to avoid
litigation, but to encourage individuals to litigate against the
government. Hence, because the rationale for the canon simply
is not served when interpreting the EAJA, it should not be ap-
plied when interpreting the EAJA.
In addition, basing an argument on canons is futile because
courts can almost always cite a different canon to support the
contrary position.194 The same holds true for the EAJA.
Although the Clarke court relied on the canon that waivers of
sovereign immunity should be construed strictly, the court ig-
nored a more popular canon of construction that leads to the
opposite result: remedial statutes should be construed
broadly.195 For example, a court might construct the following
argument: The EAJA is a remedial statute.196 Congress passed
the statute because it recognized a problem - the expense of
193. See supra Part I. B. 2. b.; see also Oguachuba v. INS, 706 F.2d 93, 98 (2d
Cir. 1983) (purpose of EAJA is to deter government from bringing unjust suits
or acting arbitrarily). Consequently, the purpose of the EAJA indicates that
the government not only is willing to tolerate interference and constraints but
even actively seeks such burdens so that it will operate fairly.
The sovereign immunity doctrine should not apply in this context for an-
other reason. Because the canon rests on the principle that litigation should
not interfere with vital government processes, J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 190,
§ 62.01, at 111, application of the canon should be relaxed when the waiver of
immunity does not interfere with those processes, id § 62.02, at 124. The
EAJA merely requires the government to pay attorney fees to parties who
prevail in litigation against it. The EAJA does not create an underlying cause
of action against the United States. Therefore, liberal interpretation of the
EAJA does not interfere with vital government processes. Comment, The
Waiver of Immunity in the Equal Access to Justice Act: Clariying Opaque
Language, 61 WASH. L. REv. 217, 240 (1986). Thus, the canon is inapplicable to
EAJA fee situations.
194. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,
401 (1950).
195. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) ("As remedial legis-
lation, § 1983 is to be construed generously to further its primary purpose.")
(citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 636 (1980)); Whirlpool
Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1980) (Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 legislation is remedial and prophylactic in nature, thus safety legisla-
tion is to be liberally construed to effectuate the congressional purpose); J.
SUTHERLAND, supra note 190, § 60.01, at 55.
196. See supra Part I. B. 2. b. (stating the problems Congress hoped to rem-
edy by passing the EAJA).
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litigation deterred people from defending against substantially
unjustified government action.197 The EAJA helped to remedy
this problem by putting the individual and the government on a
more equal footing. The EAJA allows the individual to charge
the government for her attorney fees if she prevails in the liti-
gation and the agency action was unreasonable.19 Because the
statute is remedial, courts should interpret it broadly to address
the problem Congress sought to solve. Therefore, courts should
apply the EAJA to deportation proceedings.
D. PROPOSED BRIGHT LINE APPROACH
Despite the other analytical flaws in the Clarke opinion,
the Third Circuit correctly sought a bright-line rule. Its pro-
posed rule, however, is somewhat unworkable: courts still have
difficulty determining whether the APA governs an agency ad-
judication. 99 A functional analysis, on the other hand, affords
a more successful bright line rule. It can offer the same ease of
application as the "governed under" rule while providing re-
sults more consistent with the EAJA's purposes.
In determining whether the EAJA applies to a particular
proceeding, courts should consider the phrase "under section
554" to be a shorthand way of telling the court to look at the
requirements of section 554 to see whether the agency must
comply with those requirements in the adjudication. The real
questions for courts should be whether a statute requires the
agency to have a hearing on the record2° ° and whether counsel
represented the government at the hearing.20 1 If the answer to
both is yes, the adjudication should be subject to possible fee
awards under the EAJA. Thus, the EAJA applies if "the
agency is required by statute to have the adjudication deter-
mined on the record after an opportunity for an agency hear-
ing, and counsel represented the government at the hearing. '20 2
197. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 30, at 5-6, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws at 4984.
198. Id-
199. See, e.g., supra note 103 and text accompanying note 131 (debate over
whether social security hearings are governed by the APA).
200. These are the APA requirements for a hearing that the EAJA refers
to in 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i) (1988).
201. This is the third requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i) (1988) for an
"adversary adjudication."
202. The requirement in 5 U.S.C. § 504 (b)(1)(C)(i) that an adversary adju-
dication be "under section 554" leads to the 5 U.S.C. § 554 definition of adjudi-
cation. Section 554 applies "in every case of adjudication required by statute to
be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 5
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1. What is a hearing?
Courts first will have to determine whether the statute re-
quires a hearing. The statute usually will state explicitly
whether a "hearing" or "proceeding" is required.20 3 If the stat-
ute is ambiguous, courts should consider whether the proceed-
ing at issue contemplates adversaries litigating. If so, a hearing
sufficient to warrant applying the EAJA exists. For example,
the INA requires that the allegedly deportable alien be allowed
to present evidence, cross-examine government witnesses, and
examine the evidence against her.2° 4 This language demon-
strates an adversarial process. Courts should also consider
whether the statute requires a neutral third party to referee
the proceeding, or whether a third party will decide the con-
flicts between two parties. If so, the proceeding is a "hearing"
within the meaning of the EAJA.
2. On the record
Usually the statute also will state explicitly if the hearing
must be on the record. For example, the INA states that a de-
termination of deportability be "on the record."20 5 All a statute
must require, however, is that the hearing be recorded so that a
written transcript exists. In closer cases, courts can look to
whether a person has the right to appeal to discover if a record
is required. If so, the hearing is on the record because the ap-
pellate body needs a written history of the proceeding.
3. Counsel for the government
Courts can determine easily whether counsel represented
the government by looking at the record of the hearing. For
example, a review of the record of an alien's hearing before the
immigration judge would show whether counsel represented
the government.20 6 Further, counsel need not be a licensed at-
U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988). Thus, "under section 554" is just shorthand for saying
that Congress wanted the EAJA to apply when the adjudication is on the rec-
ord after an opportunity for a hearing.
203. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C § 1252(b) (1988)
("[d]etermination of deportability in any case shall be made only upon a record
made in a proceeding before a special inquiry officer").
204. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988).
205. Id
206. As noted in Escobar Ruiz, the government did not attempt to contra-
dict the fact that the INS is not represented by counsel in deportation proceed-
ings. Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
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torney;20 7 rather, counsel need only be someone who advocates
the government's position.
The INA requires that a determination of deportability be
made on the record in a proceeding,208 and that counsel repre-
sent the government during the adjudication. Thus, courts us-
ing the above rule would allow EAJA fees in deportation
proceedings. The rule is easily applied, and also furthers the
purposes of the EAJA. Because adjudications determined on
the record after an agency hearing tend to be expensive and
time consuming,2 0 9 claimants may be discouraged from defend-
ing their rights. This functional rule would counter the cost de-
terrent by ensuring that aliens subject to the expense of a long,
formal hearing have the opportunity to recoup their expenses
under the EAJA if the government's position is unjustified.
CONCLUSION
The EAJA allows poor litigants to defend themselves from
substantially unjustified government action. The federal circuit
courts agree that the EAJA applies to proceedings governed by
the APA. The courts disagree, however, on whether the EAJA
applies to proceedings governed by other statutes. Because the
INA governs deportation proceedings, courts are split over
whether the EAJA applies to these adjudications. Because of
this controversy, allegedly deportable aliens may be unable to
recover attorney fees when fighting unreasonable government
action. Aliens, therefore, might not attract attorneys to their
cases, thus facing confusing deportation hearings
unrepresented.
This Note argues that the EAJA applies to deportation pro-
ceedings. The legislative history and purposes of the EAJA
support this argument. The EAJA's legislative history shows
Congress was not concerned with whether the APA governs a
proceeding, and the EAJA's purposes suggest Congress wanted
the EAJA to be applied broadly. The EAJA should cover all
agency proceedings that are required to be on the record after
an opportunity for a hearing and where counsel represents the
government's position. Courts can apply the above rule easily
to deportation proceedings and to other agency proceedings.
Such a rule properly allows individuals who undergo lengthy
207. 5 U.S.C. § 504 requires only that the government be represented by
"counsel or otherwise." 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i) (1988).
208. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988).
209. Escobar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at 1026.
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proceedings to challenge unjust government action the possibil-
ity of recovering attorney fees.
Thomas W. Holm
